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Cuba: Déjà Vu or New Beginnings
By: Ryan Forrest, Hunter W. Phillips, and Magena Rodriguez*
That the United States has long had a strained relationship with
Cuba is no secret to the international community. Most recently,
this strain has been embodied in a commercial, economic and
financial embargo that has been enforced by the United States
since 1962. That said, focusing only on this limited stretch of
history would ignore the greater context of American–Cuban
relations. This paper takes a step back to conduct a historical
analysis, examine the current state of relations, and to posit on the
potential of future economic ties between the two nations. After a
thorough examination, an overarching question emerges: Is
today’s Cuba entering an era of Déjà vu all over again where the
country’s increasing ties with the United States will mirror the
strong American influence of the early 1900’s, or is Cuba bound
for something new and distinct? Despite the temptation to assume
that America’s economic and social prowess will dominate Cuban
culture in the future, it seems more likely that societal and global
economic factors will ensure that whatever direction Cuba takes
will be on distinctly Cuban terms.
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I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Settlement of Cuba
Originally searching for a route to India on behalf of the Spanish
crown, Christopher Columbus discovered Cuba on October 28, 1492,
naming it Isla Juana, in honor of John, Prince of Asturias.1 Despite the
original moniker, the name Cuba, a variant of the name given to the island
by its native inhabitants, eventually gained favor.2 Claiming Cuba for
itself, Spain then sent Diego Velazquez to establish a settlement on the
island in 1511.3 Within five years, the Spanish had succeeded in founding
numerous cities, including Havana. They then divided Cuba into seven
municipal divisions and established civil institutions including
Catholicism, urbanized societies, the tobacco, mining, and sugary
industries, and slavery. 4 Solidifying their control on the island, the Spanish
then imposed severe protectionist restrictions that exclusively limited
trade to other Spanish enterprises.5
However, the Spanish hunger for conquest was not limited to the
acquisition of Cuba. When the Spanish discovered that the island lacked
significant silver or gold deposits, they decided to focus the brunt of their
attention on the treasures of the Aztec and Inca empires of Central
America.6 Nevertheless, while the Spanish were content to colonize and
1

PHILLIP S. FONER, A HISTORY OF CUBA AND ITS RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES
15, Vol. 1 (1962).
2
Id.
3
Cuba, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/
145542/Cuba/233435/Cultural-institutions#toc129488 (last visited October 23, 2016).
4
See id.; FONER, supra note 1, at 25, 34–35.
5
FONER, supra note 1, at 35–39.
6
FONER, supra note 1, at 39; see also ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 3.
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move on, pirates did not share that sentiment and instead chose to plunder
the island repeatedly around 1538.7

B. The Seven Years’ War
Though Cuba lacked precious metals, its abundant natural resources
eventually commanded increased attention from the Spanish, who put an
emphasis on cultivating local agricultural industries.8 This created a period
of rapid economic expansion that continued until roughly 1755, when the
Seven Years’ War (also called the French and Indian War) broke out
between most of the great powers of the time.9 During the war, Spain was
forced to confront the full–force of the British war machine who then
expanded the scope of the conflict by invading Spanish–owned Cuba with
an armada of as many as fifty (50) warships and between four thousand
(4,000) and thirteen thousand (13,000) troops.10 After a lengthy battle,
Havana fell in August of 1762.11
Upon taking control, the British opened new avenues of trade with
British territories, including the American colonies.12 As a result, hundreds
of previously–restricted merchant ships poured into Havana Harbor to
seek a piece of Cuba’s valuable sugar stockpile.13 Consequently, the
Cuban economy boomed.
Subsequently, at the end of the conflict, Spain traded Florida to the
British in exchange for Cuba.14 But, while Spain again controlled Cuba, it
did not re–impose the protectionist trade restrictions that had stifled
growth before the war.15 This new Spanish embrace of trade facilitated a
solidification of economic ties between Cuba and the American colonies.16
As time passed, however, the American Revolution occurred, and
Spain became alarmed at the prospect of losing economic control of Cuba.
As a result, it again imposed policies that prohibited international trade
7

MARGARITA CERVANTES–RODRIGUEZ, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION IN CUBA:
ACCUMULATION, IMPERIAL DESIGNS, AND TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL FIELDS 44 (2011).
8
RICHARD GOTT, CUBA: A NEW HISTORY 37 (2005).
9
Seven Years’ War, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/event/
Seven-Years-War (last visited October 23, 2016); see also GOTT, supra note 8, at 41.
10
See GOTT, supra note 8, at 41; see also Raphael Murillo, Slavery and the Siege of
Havana, BERKELEY R. LATIN AM. STUD., Fall 2013, at 20.
11
FONER, supra note 1, at 41–42; see also TED HENKEN, CUBA: A GLOBAL STUDIES
HANDBOOK 49 (2008); see also Murillo, supra note 10, at 20.
12
Murillo, supra note 10, at 20; see also FONER, supra note 1, at 42.
13
See GOTT, supra note 8, at 42; see also DALE W. TOMICH, THROUGH THE PRISM OF
SLAVERY: LABOR, CAPITAL AND WORLD ECONOMY 64 (2004).
14
See GOTT, supra note 8, at 42.
15
FONER, supra note 1, at 42–43.
16
LOUIS E. PEREZ, CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES: TIES OF SINGULAR INTIMACY 5
(2003).
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with non–Spanish entities.17 These actions were highly unpopular amongst
the island–dwelling Cubans, but they were not long–lived. Soon after,
Spain again became embroiled in wars with both France and England, and
due to the corresponding financial distress, Spain eased its trade
restrictions once more.18
As they were before, the Americans were eager to take full advantage
of Cuban stockpiles of sugar, molasses, rum and coffee, leading to the
stark revival of the Cuban economy yet again.19 The years that followed
were met with similar setbacks and steps forward as the Spanish imposed,
removed, and re–imposed trade restrictions multiple times in furtherance
of their overall economic needs.20 These fluctuations then piqued
American interests; sensing an opportunity to make a purchase from the
cash–strapped Spanish, President Thomas Jefferson sent an envoy to Cuba
to gauge the interest of the Spanish in ceding or selling the island to the
United States.21 The advances were unsuccessful.

C. Growing Ties to America
After fighting a difficult battle to control growth and trade in Cuba,
Spain finally and fully relinquished trade restrictions in 1818.22 This
embrace of free trade then facilitated the development of Spain’s worst
fears: the Cuba–United States trade connection eventually replaced the
need for Spanish commercial ties.23 These developments again enticed the
Americans, and in 1823, consistent with his previously expressed interest
in Cuba, Thomas Jefferson confided privately in a correspondence as
follows:
I candidly confess, that I have ever looked on Cuba as the
most interesting addition which could ever be made to our
system of States. The control which, with Florida Point,
this island would give us over the Gulf of Mexico, and the
countries and isthmus bordering on it, as well as all those
whose waters flow into it, would fill up the measure of
our political well–being.24
17

FONER, supra note 1, at 44, 67; PEREZ, supra note 16, at 7.
PEREZ, supra note 16, at 7.
19
Id.; FONER, supra note 1, at 68.
20
PEREZ, supra note 16, at 6–7.
21
BRENDAN SAINSBURY, CUBA 36 (2009).
22
PEREZ, supra note 16, at 13.
23
Id.
24
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, President of the U.S. (Oct. 24, 1823),
http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/presidents/thomas-jefferson/letters-of-thomas-jefferson/jefl275.
php.
18
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In fact, Jefferson told John C. Calhoun, the Secretary of War, that the
United States “ought, at the first possible opportunity, to take Cuba.”25
These thoughts were not limited to Jefferson though. In a letter to the U.S.
Minister to Spain, then Secretary of State John Quincy Adams expounded
on the likelihood that Cuba would be annexed in short order, opining that
[t]here are laws of political as well as of physical
gravitation; and if an apple severed by the tempest from
its native tree cannot choose but fall to the ground, Cuba,
forcibly disjoined from its own unnatural connection with
Spain, and incapable of self–support, can gravitate only
toward the North American Union, which by the same law
of nature cannot cast her off from its bosom.26
As the ties between the two nations continued to strengthen,
Americans were purchasing 82 percent of Cuba’s total exports by 1877.27
This economic relationship fostered close cultural connections as well,
leading some travelers and thinkers of the time to ponder Cuba’s fate.
English traveler Anthony Trollope speculated that “[t]he trades of the
country is falling into the hands of foreigners, Havana will soon be as
American as New Orleans.”28
Yet, American influence in Cuba was not the only concerning factor
for the Spanish, who faced social and economic rifts on the island, some
of which centered on opposition to slavery.29 As unrest grew, Spain
promised to take local Cuban concerns to heart.30 In the end, however, the
Spanish responded by increasing taxes and banning all political opposition
and press.31 Cubans were incensed, and passions came to a head in 1868
when sugar planter Carlos Manuel de Cespedes issued the 10th of October
Manifesto, freeing his slaves and calling for independence from Spain.32
As the movement spread, the number of rebellious Cubans swelled to over
12,000.33 By 1869, the movement had stated its intent to abolish slavery,
25

CATHERINE DELMAS, CHRISTINE VANDAMME, DONNA SPALDING ANDREOLLE, SCIENCE
AND EMPIRE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: A JOURNEY OF IMPERIAL CONQUEST AND
SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS 118 (2010).
26
GOTT, supra note 8, at 13.
27

Louis A. Perez Jr., Cuba and the United States: Origins and Antecedents of Relations,
1760s–1860s, 21 UNIV. PITT. 57, 69 (1991).
28
PEREZ, supra note 16, at 14.
29
PHILLIP S. FONER, A HISTORY OF CUBA AND ITS RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES,
156–59, Vol. 2 (1962).
30
Id.; see also PBS, 1868–1878: Ten Years’ War in Cuba (last visited Oct. 12, 2016),
https://www.pbs.org/crucible/tl1.html.
31
PBS, supra note 30.
32
FONER, supra note 29, at 171.
33
Id. at 174.
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and given America’s then–recent war on the issue, the sentiment to support
the annexation of Cuba to the United States became widespread.34
For obvious reasons, these developments were not palatable to the
Spanish. Consequently, the Spanish deployed approximately 100,000
soldiers to Cuba and declared that anyone caught with a weapon would be
executed.35 The military occupation proved effective, and when combined
with the competing visions of the revolutionaries, the death of Cespedes,
and Spain’s repeated promises to accede to some of the revolutionary
desires, the Spaniards once again consolidated their stranglehold on
power.36
However, Spanish promises to accommodate Cuban desires for
autonomy went unfulfilled yet again, and Cuba remained subjugated.37
This schism between words and actions eventually resulted in a number of
armed conflicts.

D. Struggle for Independence
Three liberation wars were ultimately fought by the Cubans against
the Spanish: the Ten Years War (1868–1878), the Little War (1879–1880)
and the Cuban War of Independence (1895–1898).38 In the face of these
conflicts, Cuba still needed trading partners, thus commerce with the
American colonies continued to flourish. Accordingly, by the mid 1890’s,
the United States was Cuba’s main trading partner.39 These ties facilitated
American social dominance. According to observers of the times, Cuba
was a de facto economic colony of the United States by the beginning of
the year 1895.40
Meanwhile, a Cuban intellectual named Jose Marti, who had
previously been exiled by the Spanish, began disseminating information
regarding the Cuba Libre movement (“A Free Cuba”) in the United
States.41 By the same token, as Jefferson and Adams had before, Secretary
of State, James G. Blaine noted in 1881 that
that rich island, the key to the Gulf of Mexico, and the
field for our most extended trade in the Western
34

GOTT, supra note 8, at 79; PBS, supra note 30.
FONER, supra note 29, at 196, 261, 274; see also JOSE M. HERNANDEZ, CUBA AND THE
UNITED STATES: INTERVENTION AND MILITARISM 1868–1933, at 12 (1993).
36
See SAINSBURY, supra note 21, at 38; see also HERNANDEZ, supra note 35, at 14.
37
HENKEN, supra note 11, at 66.
38
Cuban Independence Movement, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.
com/event/Cuban-Independence-Movement#ref266526 (last visited Oct. 1, 2016).
39
FONER, supra note 29, at 298.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 305.
35
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Hemisphere, is, though in the hands of Spain, a part of the
American commercial system . . . If ever ceasing to be
Spanish, Cuba must necessarily become American and
not fall under any other European domination.42
In February of 1895, uprisings against the Spanish were staged across
the Cuban territory.43 Marti himself returned to Cuba after authoring the
Manifesto de Montecristi, which outlined the reasons for Cuba’s
independence movement.44 Bold as this move may have been, it led to his
death shortly thereafter when he was killed in a battle against Spanish
forces.45 Nevertheless, Marti’s image was engrained in Cuban lore and his
compatriots continued on, gaining momentum in their fight for
independence.
At this point the rebellion in Cuba was not the only battle Spain was
fighting, as it also faced an independence movement over territories it
controlled in the Philippines.46 The combined burden of financing both
efforts strained the Spanish. Watching closely, the United States
recognized an opportunity to use Spain’s crisis to its advantage and in
1897 again offered to buy Cuba.47 The Spanish emphatically rejected the
offer once more.48
Shortly after Spain’s rejection of the American offer, a riot by Spanish
loyalists broke out in Havana, and the American Consulate informed
Washington D.C. that they possessed legitimate fears for the safety of
Americans in the area.49 As a result, the United States deployed the USS
Maine battleship to Havana in late January of 1898.50 Nearly two weeks
after its arrival, on February 15, 1898, an unexpected explosion tore apart
the USS Maine in the middle of the night, killing 260 sleeping crew
members and sinking the ship.51 Although the cause of the explosion
42

Jerry A. Sierra, José Martí: Apostle of Cuban Independence, HISTORYOFCUBA,
http://www.historyofcuba.com/history/marti/marti.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2016).
43
CLIFFORD L. STATEN, THE HISTORY OF CUBA 36 (2005).
44
ALFRED J. LOPEZ, JOSE MARTI: A REVOLUTIONARY LIFE 289 (2014).
45
STATEN, supra note 43, at 36.
46
THE WAR OF 1898 AND U.S. INTERVENTIONS, AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 424 (Benjamin R.
Beede ed., 2d ed. 2013) [hereinafter Beede].
47
FRANK R. VILLAFANA, EXPANSIONISM: ITS EFFECTS ON CUBA’S INDEPENDENCE 205
(2011).
48
MARK EATON BYRNES, JAMES K. POLK: A BIOGRAPHICAL COMPANION 48 (2001).
49
DAVID M. PLETCHER, THE DIPLOMACY OF TRADE AND INVESTMENT: AMERICAN
ECONOMIC EXPANSION IN THE HEMISPHERE, 1865–1900, at 337 (1998).
50
Dark Suspicions Cling to Ghost of U.S.S. Maine, BOCA RATON NEWS, Feb. 8, 1998, at
10A.
51
LINDLEY M. GARRISON, FINAL REPORT ON REMOVING THE U.S.S. “MAINE” FROM
HARBOR OF HABANA CUBA: LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR, TRANSMITTING WITH A
LETTER FROM THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS, FINAL REPORT OF A SPECIAL BOARD OF ENGINEER
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remains a mystery to this day, the first analysis by the United States
indicated that it was due to a mine placed underneath the ship.52
Afterwards, The American media picked up the USS Maine story and ran
it with limited information, leading to the wide dissemination of a number
of sensationalized theories regarding the explosion.53
Eventually, a groundswell of negative opinions toward the Spanish
formed in the United States, and on April 11, 1898, President McKinley
asked Congress for approval to send troops to Cuba to end hostilities
between the Spanish and the native–Cubans.54 War was declared soon
after.55 This plunge into conflict was not without a counterbalance though,
as Henry M. Teller boot–strapped an amendment to the joint resolution of
Congress that prevented the United States from annexing Cuba and
recognized the sovereignty of the Cuban people.56 This became known as
the Teller Amendment.57
In short order, American ships moved into place to blockade Cuban
ports, and American troops poured onto the island.58 Once there, they
combined forces with the already–entrenched Cubans and set their sights
on dismantling the Spanish military ranks.59 These combined forces
eventually won the day over the Spanish.60 On December 10, 1898, both
Spain and the United States signed the Treaty of Paris and Spain
renounced all rights to Cuba.61 Notably, the Cubans were excluded from
nearly the entire process.62
This exclusion portended the fates of Cubans on the island. The
Spanish had relinquished their interests in Cuba and handed de–facto
control to the United States.63 Almost immediately after, the United States
OFFICERS ON RAISING AND REMOVING THE WRECK OF THE U. S. BATTLESHIP “MAINE” FROM
THE HARBOR OF HABANA, CUBA, H.R. REP. No. 480, at 7 (2nd Sess. 1914).
52

Id.
Id.
54
GERHARD PETERS, JOHN T. WOOLLEY, MICHAEL NELSON, THE PRESIDENCY: A TO Z
377 (2012).
55
Id.
56
J. Res. 24, 55th Cong., 30 Stat. 738 (1898).
57
CHRIS J. MAGOC & DAVID BERNSTEIN, IMPERIALISM AND EXPANSIONISM IN AMERICAN
HISTORY: A SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND CULTURAL ENCYCLOPEDIA AND DOCUMENT
COLLECTION 767–68 (2016).
58
Beede, supra note 46, at 287 (2013).
59
Id.
60
Toral Surrenders, THE CLINTON MIRROR, July 23, 1898, at 6, https://news.google.
com/newspapers?nid=8Z0Dsp3hPRYC&dat=18980723&printsec=frontpage&hl=en.
61
A Treaty of Peace Between the United States and Spain, U.S.–Spain, part I, Dec. 10,
1898, S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 62 (1899).
62
ANDREW P. NAPOLITANO, THEODORE AND WOODROW: HOW TWO AMERICAN
PRESIDENTS DESTROYED CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOM 189 (2012).
63
Id.
53
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installed Jon R. Brooke, a major general in the United States Army, as the
Governor of Cuba and instituted a liberal military oversight system.64

E. The Platt Amendment
In 1901, facing increased feelings of unease from the American public
for leaving a standing occupying force in Cuba, Congress passed the Platt
Amendment which allowed the United States to withdraw its troops from
Cuba. 65 Notably, its approval hinged on Cuba’s simultaneous approval of
certain portions of the law allowing the United States to intervene in
Cuban affairs for the “preservation of Cuban independence, [and] the
maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property,
and individual liberty . . . .”66 Notably, the Platt Amendment also leased
Guantanamo Bay to the United States for the nominal annual fee of $2,000
in gold. 67
Despite American troops having withdrawn because of the agreement,
their absence was not long–lasting. Instead, using its newly granted
authority to intervene in Cuban affairs, the United States was forced to
stabilize the island in 1906 with the collapse of Cuban President Tomas
Estrada Palma’s administration.68
Afterwards, Secretary of War (and future American president)
William Howard Taft declared himself Provisional Governor of Cuba on
September 29, 1906.69 Four years later, following the election of Jose
Miguel Gomez, the occupation was ended, and the Gomez administration
was judged to be sufficient to provide the necessary stability in Cuba.70 In
the years that followed, the United States intervened in Cuba a number of
times as in an attempt to stabilize the Cuban government.71 Unfortunately,
the instability could not be remedied and eventually resulted in an
economic depression.72 As a result, in 1934 the Cuban government was

64

See VILLAFANA, supra note 47, at 175.
Platt Amendment, ch. 803, 31 STAT. 895, 897 (1901).
66
Id.
67
HOWARD BALL, THE USA PATRIOT ACT OF 2001: BALANCING CIVIL LIBERTIES AND
NATIONAL SECURITY 146 (2004); LOUIS A. PÉREZ JR., THE STRUCTURE OF CUBAN HISTORY:
MEANINGS AND PURPOSE OF THE PAST 168 (2013).
68
VILLAFANA, supra note 47, at 194.
69
See SEAN DENNIS CASHMAN, AMERICA IN THE AGE OF THE TITANS: THE PROGRESSIVE
ERA AND WORLD WAR I 453 (1988); see also MAURICE ZEITLIN & ROBERT SCHEER, CUBA:
TRAGEDY IN OUR HEMISPHERE 35 (1963).
70
CASHMAN, supra note 69, at 453.
71
JULES ROBERT BENJAMIN, THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA: HEGEMONY AND
DEPENDENT DEVELOPMENT, 1880–1934, at 21–23 (1977).
72
Id. at 29.
65
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overthrown by a right wing and military coalition led by Fulgencio Batista
Zaldivar.73

F. Batista’s Reign
Following the coup, Batista was originally content to remain in the
shadows behind a series of weak Presidents, but he could not contain his
ambitions forever: in 1940 he was elected President after campaigning
with the endorsement of the Cuban communist party.74 After serving his
term, he stepped down and resumed wielding power as a shadow
administrator. 75 Nevertheless, in 1952, he organized a second bloodless
coup three months before another presidential election was set to take
place.76 The sitting President at the time, Carlos Prio Socarras, did little to
rebut the mutiny, thereby allowing Batista to depose him and take direct
control of the state once more.77
Batista’s subsequent reign was defined by opposing contrasts. While
the country was marked by economic corruption, wages rose
significantly.78 The average industrial salary was higher than some western
European nations, the Cuban health system was cutting edge, and a large
middle class came into existence that was replete with rights and
protections of the modern era, such as the eight–hour workday.79
Moreover, Batista’s Cuba had a high literacy rate and the fifth highest
number of televisions per capita in the world.80
At this time, 60% of Cuba’s exports and 80% of its imports were
attributed to the United States.81 Even so, a large portion of the country
remained in abject poverty, and those that had reached the middle class
grew discontented. Furthermore, Cuban laws instituting stifling taxes and
favoring workers at the expense of industrial advancements soon
contributed to an economic stagnation.82 These problems would eventually
lead to Batista’s demise.

73

RAMÓN L. BONACHEA & MARTA SAN MARTIN, THE CUBAN INSURRECTION: 1952–
1959, at xvi–xv (1974).
74
HARRIS M. LENTZ, HEADS OF STATES AND GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1945, at 203 (2014).
75
Id.
76
BONACHEA & SAN MARTIN, supra note 73, at 1.
77
See id. at xvi.
78
PAUL H. LEWIS, AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES IN LATIN AMERICA: DICTATORS, DESPOTS,
AND TYRANTS 186 (2006).
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
FRANCISCO LÓPEZ SEGRERA, THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA: FROM CLOSEST ENEMIES
TO DISTANT FRIENDS 9 (2017).
82
THOMAS F. O’BRIEN, THE REVOLUTIONARY MISSION: AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN LATIN
AMERICA, 1900–1945, at 327 (1999).
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G. Castro’s Revolution
After Batista’s coup, a law school graduate and aspiring politician
named Fidel Castro filed suit against Batista for his violations of the Cuban
constitution.83 However, the courts ruled that the revolution was a lawful
source of power.84 Taking note, Castro, along with his brother, Raũl, began
to build revolutionary cells to overthrow the Batista government through
force.85 As a result of these efforts, on July 26, 1953, Castro led 95 men in
an attack on the government–held Moncada military barracks in an attempt
to start widespread armed insurrection.86 The Cuban government easily
defeated the attack, and Castro was captured and subsequently tried,
convicted, and sentenced to 15 years in prison.87
Despite the length of his sentence, Castro was released only two years
later in 1955 and ultimately went into self–imposed exile in Mexico.88 It
was there that he met Ernesto “Che” Guevara.89 Together, Castro and
Guevara plotted to return to Cuba and overthrow Batista, eventually
setting out to accomplish their goals in 1956 with a unit of approximately
80 guerrilla fighters.90 Though Batista’s forces crushed the original
advance, neither Castro nor Guevara were captured, and they escaped to
the mountainous regions of southeastern Cuba to regroup.91
From their safe haven, Castro and Guevara plotted their next moves
and based their strategies on guerilla warfare tactics.92 Meanwhile,
opposition to Batista spread, and Castro again led offensive maneuvers
against the Cuban forces. Batista’s forces responded brutally by executing
rebels and—in some circumstances—practicing torture to extract desired
information.93 Batista also instituted Operation Verano, a full–blown
attack against the rebels, which consisted of bombing the forested and
mountainous areas of southeastern Cuba, and sending 10,000 troops to
subdue Castro’s forces.94 This plan, however, was doomed for failure
83

RAMÓN L. BONACHEA & MARTA SAN MARTIN, THE CUBAN INSURRECTION: 1952–
1959, at 14 (2011).
84
Id.
85
LEYCESTER COLTMAN, THE REAL FIDEL CASTRO 66 (2008).
86
BONACHEA & SAN MARTIN, supra note 73, at 20.
87
Id. at 28.
88
Anthony DePalma, Fidel Castro, Cuban Revolutionary Who Defied U.S., Dies at 90,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2016, at A1.
89
FRAN REES, FIDEL CASTRO: LEADER OF COMMUNIST CUBA 48 (2006).
90
Id. at 49.
91
ELLIOT JOHNSON, DAVID WALKER, DANIEL GRAY, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF
MARXISM 108 (2014).
92
TAD SZULC, THE UNITED STATES AND THE CARIBBEAN 30 (1971).
93
RENÉ DE LA PEDRAJA, WARS OF LATIN AMERICA, 1948–1982: THE RISE OF THE
GUERRILLAS 58 (2013).
94
JOHNSON, WALKER, GRAY, supra note 91, at 109.
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because Castro possessed superior knowledge of the mountainous terrain,
allowing him to evade the airstrikes and to thwart the onslaught of the
army attack. With each battle, Castro’s legend grew and his forces gained
strength.95
Nevertheless, Batista was not without friends as the United States had
long been shipping arms to the Batista government, including rifles,
grenades, rockets, tanks, machine guns, and bombs.96 Yet, as the war
dragged on, the United States began to doubt the return on its investment,
and in March of 1958 it suspended all arms trading with Cuba.97 Moreover,
as the chances of a government victory waned, the general that Batista had
originally dispatched to quell Castro’s rebellion, Eulogio Cantillo, defied
his orders by entering into a secret agreement with Castro, promising him
that upon victory, Batista would be tried in a court of law as a war
criminal.98
This promise would never come to be as Batista was able to sense his
impending defeat. As a result, on January 1, 1959, he fled Cuba with more
than $300,000,000 dollars in tow.99 Castro, incensed at Batista’s escape,
set his sights on Havana, eventually arriving as a conqueror later that
week.100
Manuel Urrutia Lleo was then proclaimed the provisional president,
and Castro—much like Batista before him—assumed a role behind the
scenes.101 The similarities, however, stopped there. Soon thereafter, the
Cuban congress was dismissed, and a ban on political parties was enacted
despite the repeated claims that elections would be held.102 The newly
empowered regime also set out to try many former Batista officials,
resulting in a number of farcical trials and military executions.103
Reacting to concerns that the trials of these officials were unfair,
Castro stated that “revolutionary justice is not based on legal precepts, but
on moral conviction.”104 Meanwhile, the rights of Cuban citizens also
began to be culled when a system of secretive neighborhood watch
networks, known as Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, were
established to ensure loyalty to the regime.105 This system of spying
95
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informants fostered a culture of paranoia and terror as those accused of
harboring anti–Castro sentiments, hatching plans to defect, or to
overthrow the government were jailed or sentenced to hard labor.106
Additionally, existing media outlets were either shut down or replaced
with government run entities.107
Castro then made his hold on power official in February of 1959 when
he was sworn in as the Prime Minister of Cuba.108 During his early years,
he intentionally concealed his Communist/Marxist ideology in favor of a
more democratic façade that he believed would help gain supporters to his
cause.109 Eventually, however, his true colors began to show. The United
States, who had watched the proceedings with a keen eye, thereafter
determined that Castro’s leadership was not conducive to American
interests in the region.110 Thus, relations between the United States and
Cuba “fluctuated between open hostility and quiet estrangement” in the
years immediately following the Cuban revolution, and the CIA and the
Eisenhower Administration began to fund various movements opposed to
the Castro government. 111
Coinciding with these developments, in February of 1960, a French
supply ship that was docked in Havana to unload firearms mysteriously
exploded.112 Despite the inherently dangerous nature of the cargo being
unloaded and the lack of conclusive proof as to the cause of the incident,
the Castro government aggressively set their sights on a single entity to
blame: the United States.113
Within the same month, the Soviet Union signed a trade agreement
with Cuba, agreeing to buy sugar in exchange for Cuba’s purchase of
Soviet crude oil.114 The United States, currently engaged in the Cold War,
reacted by enacting a series of policies aimed at crippling the Cuban
106
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economy. First, the United States advised American–owned oil refiners in
Cuba to refrain from refining Soviet crude.115 This sparked a back–and–
forth between the American and Cuban governments.
First, Cuba retaliated by nationalizing all American refineries on the
island.116 Next, the United States dramatically cut the Cuban sugar
quota.117 Without hesitation, Cuba then nationalized the remaining bulk of
American businesses and privately owned land.118 Seeing no other option,
in October of 1960, the United States imposed a prohibition against all
trade except food and medicine.119 Continuing that theme, in January of
1961, President Eisenhower severed all diplomatic relations with Cuba
shortly before leaving office.120

H. Kennedy and Cuba
As President Eisenhower exited, the Kennedy administration took
over. Almost immediately, President Kennedy authorized what became
one of the largest military and foreign policy blunders in American
history—the Bay of Pigs invasion.121 Here, the American government,
through the Central Intelligence Agency, planned an invasion of
American–trained Cuban exiles with the goal of toppling the Castro
government. The mission was doomed, however, by a mixture of poor
planning and a lack of support.122 Within two days of launching an
invasion in Playa Giron, all the fighters were surrounded and captured.123
Adding insult to injury, they were publicly interrogated (in some
humiliating instances, by Castro himself), and they were eventually sent
back to the United States in exchange for food, medicine, and money.124
This intensified the divide between Cuba and the United States and
resulted in a public relations firestorm for President Kennedy.125
115
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Thereafter, in December of 1961, Castro declared himself to be a
Marxist–Leninist, and stated that Cuba would officially operate under a
Communist regime.126 This provided the necessary motivation for the
Kennedy administration to redouble their efforts regarding Cuba. Most
pertinently, President Kennedy authorized Operation Mongoose, which
was a covert sabotage campaign aimed at targeting both the Castro
government and Castro himself.127
Kennedy also imposed a formal and complete embargo on all trade,
travel, and financial interaction with Cuba.128 This embargo is still in effect
today, and its effects were strengthened by the passage of multiple
congressional acts such as the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 and the
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996.129 Furthermore,
Cuba was added to the Department of State’s State Sponsors of Terrorism
List, which precluded financial entities doing business in the United States
from interacting with Cuba as a result of punitive economic reprisals.130
All things considered, these hostile relations resulting from the Cuban
Embargo resembled nothing more than a mere childhood squabble in
comparison to the events of 1962 when an American reconnaissance plane
detected the secret installation of Soviet–controlled medium range nuclear
ballistic missiles in Cuba.131 The missiles had been installed as a counter–
balance to American nuclear weapons that had been in Eastern Europe at
the time.132 Facing what it considered as an existential threat, the United
States immediately instituted a naval quarantine to keep Soviet ships from
supplying the island with more armaments.133 As it turned out, Cuba had
accepted the missiles in secrecy; upon their discovery, Castro urged the
Soviet Union to attack the United States to prevent the possibility of an
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invasion of the island.134 Fortunately, this threat never materialized.
Ultimately, the Soviet Premier, Nikita Khrushchev, excluded Castro from
negotiations regarding the nuclear weapons in Cuba, wherein the Soviets
agreed to remove the missiles in return for the extraction of similar
American nuclear weapons that had been placed in Turkey.135
In 1963, due to the growing concern over the narrow application of
the Cuban Import Regulations—specifically the failure to address third–
country imports of Cuban goods or goods that contained Cuban materials
from third countries and failure to prevent U.S. citizens of U.S owned
subsidiaries in third countries from trading with Cuba—the administration
enacted the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (“CACR”).136 The law
strengthened the embargo by broadening prohibitions on trade with
Cuba.137 In fact, with a few exceptions,138 the law prohibited virtually all
unlicensed commercial, financial, and trade transactions with Cuba or a
Cuban national by any person, wherever located, subject to U.S.
jurisdiction.139 It also put a total freeze on all property owned by Cuba or
a Cuban national that is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.140
Importantly, the embargo was not meant to be punitive, but rather to
pressure the Cuban government to introduce democracy and a free market
economy to the Cuban people.141 The underlying logic of the embargo was
grounded in four aspirations:
1) that the embargo would severely hurt the Cuban
economy, 2) that Fidel Castro and his government would
of their own volition react to a severe deterioration of the
economy by implementing desired changes, or else, 3)
that they would be forced to do so by the threat of popular
discontent, and 4) that no sizable external source(s) of
134
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resources could counterbalance the expected effects of the
embargo.142
Following the Cuban missile crisis, dissent aimed at Castro’s
government grew both abroad and within Cuba. As a result, in 1965, the
Castro government temporarily allowed what would become known as the
“Freedom Flights” program, wherein nearly 300,000 people were allowed
to leave Cuba for the United States.143 While the Castro government
officially allowed people to leave, there was often a wait between approval
to leave the country and the actual conduction of the Freedom Flights due
to the long lists of those who wished to flee communist Cuba.144 During
that time, many of those who signed up were persecuted and harassed.145

I. Carter’s Rollbacks
As time passed, relations with Cuba were deemphasized as the
Vietnam War and the cultural tribulations of the 1960’s and 70’s came to
the forefront. Consequently, President Carter took office in 1977 when
congressional chatter regarding Cuba was quiet. However, the new chief
executive was determined to change that.146
During his first year in office, Carter took steps to normalize relations
with Cuba, including lifting the restrictions on travel (as well as an
allowance of the purchase of up to $100 of Cuban goods during any single
visit), and the signing of a bilateral fishing rights and maritime boundaries
agreement.147 More major changes followed, including opening “interests
sections” in Washington D.C. and Havana that functioned in similar
capacity of that of ambassadors and embassies,148 and discontinuing the
blacklisting of foreign ships engaged in trade with Cuba.149
Nevertheless, President Carter’s steps toward normalization of
relations were undermined when a series of events stripped him of the
political capacity necessary to make substantial changes. First, Cuba’s
aggressive military engagements, most notably alongside the Soviet Union
in the Ogaden War in Ethiopia in 1978, stalled any momentum that had
weighed in favor of closer ties.150 The final straw, however, came in 1979
142
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with the American media’s discovery of a soviet military brigade housed
in Cuba.151 Although the existence of the brigade had been known by the
United States for years, the corresponding media coverage scuttled any
hope for progress on the issue.152

J. The Mariel Boatlift
While American policy progress was stalled, the discontent within
Castro’s Cuba continued to grow. As a result of a stagnating economy,
political and social crackdowns and housing and job shortages, in the late
1970’s untold thousands continued their attempts to flee the island.153 This
came to a head in 1980 when five Cubans drove a stolen bus through a
fence into the Peruvian embassy in Havana.154 The passengers onboard the
bus were granted asylum, but one guard was killed when the other guards
opened fire.155
Word quickly spread through Cuba about the incident and Peru’s grant
of asylum, and thousands turned out to flock to other embassies requesting
similar aid.156 Facing pressure as a result of the resulting international
public relations debacle, Castro announced that those wanting to flee Cuba
could gather at the Port of Mariel to board boats bound for the United
States.157 This was arguably made possible by the Jimmy Carter
administration, who had established the United States Interests Section in
Havana to further U.S. political and diplomatic objectives.158 This offer
did not fall on deaf ears, and over 120,000 people took to the waters of the
Straits of Florida in search of the basic civil liberties afforded in
America.159 The United States, with a long history of accepting of Cuban
immigrants, responded by assigning Coast Guard ships to assist the fleeing
vessels.160
Refugee compounds were set up in Key West and Miami, Florida to
process and document each new arrival.161 Once processed, the refugees
151
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were then moved to other compounds around the country, including those
in Pennsylvania, Wisconsin and Arkansas.162 But the successful arrival of
the Cuban migrants did not quell all of the discontent that had been
simmering in their hearts, and the refugees in the immigration processing
center in Fort Chaffee, Arkansas staged a very public riot as a result of the
conditions they experienced.163 Observing the process, Castro could barely
conceal his vitriol, calling those who left “scum” and eventually ending
the program in 1973.164
Further complicating the issue, after the boatlift was initiated, it
emerged that a portion of the refugees had criminal histories in Cuba or
suffered from disabilities.165 Castro thus viewed them as undesirables and
cruelly stated that he had “flush[ed] the toilets” of Cuba by allowing them
to leave.166
Some refugees, who the United States determined had committed
crimes, were detained as excludable aliens. This created its own “catch
22,” as the Cuban government would not take them back and the United
States would not let them in.167 Nevertheless, the boatlift and the
Marielitos (as those who fled came to be called) were eventually viewed
as an expression of America’s enduring commitment to freedom. Its
positive effects can be found today in communities across the country,
including Miami, Florida, where those who came on the boat lift can be
found in positions of community leadership including doctors and
entrepreneurs.168
In the years that followed the Mariel Boatlift, the Soviet Union began
to experience severe economic difficulties, resulting in a decrease in
162
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support for its Cuban ally.169 This economic stress was amplified by the
administration of President Ronald Reagan, which tightened the embargo
and re–established the ban on travel to and from Cuba.170 As a result,
Castro introduced austerity measures curtailing electricity usage and
rationing food.171 Soon after, in order to meet the increasing demands of
an economy in peril, Cuba placed an increasing emphasis on the promotion
of tourism on the island.172 Down the line, this decision would lead to the
2004 introduction of a two–tiered economic system, consisting of the
domestically held Cuban peso and the more valuable and largely tourist–
used Cuban convertible peso.173
Nevertheless, seeing an opportunity to finally oust Castro from power,
the United States continued to tighten regulations as they applied to Cuba.
In 1992, the Cuban Democracy Act was passed, which prohibited foreign–
based subsidiaries of American companies from engaging in trade with
Cuban entities, or sending remittances to individuals in Cuba, while also
allowing donation of food and the trade of medical supplies as long as the
intention was to help the Cuban people.174

K. The Clinton Years and Helms–Burton
During the early years of the Clinton administration, the United States
amended the embargo several times, including decreasing restrictions on
travel and remittances.175 Nevertheless, any progress that might have been
made was dashed in February of 1996, when the Cuban Air Force shot
down two unarmed Cessna planes operated by the group “Brothers to the
Rescue.”176 Prior to the incident, the group was well known for its flights
over the Straits of Florida where it spotted and assisted Cuban refugee–
rafters bound for the United States and also for dropping anti–Castro
leaflets over Cuba.177 The attack resulted in the deaths of three Cuban–
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American U.S. citizens and one U.S. resident.178 In the wake of the shoot
down, tensions ran high as congress urged the Clinton administration to
adopt an ever–more stringent Cuban sanctions profile.
Notably, the attacks proved to be the catalyst for passage of the Cuban
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act (otherwise known as
“Helms–Burton” for the bill’s sponsors, Jesse Helms and Dan Burton),
which had a number of effects on the relationship between the United
States and Cuba.179 First, the law strengthened the embargo by extending
its application to foreign countries that conducted trade with Cuba.180
Second, the law provided that the President of the United States should
oppose and vote against Cuba’s inclusion in the Organization of American
States.181 Third, Helms–Burton prohibited trafficking in property
confiscated by the Cuban government and denies United States entry visas
to officers or stockholders of any suspected trafficking companies.182
Fourth, the bill included a provision codifying the Cuban embargo which
gave Congress the sole power to repeal or alter the law rather than the
executive branch.183
Specifically, the bill stipulated that the embargo would remain in
effect until Cuba (1) is governed pursuant to free and fair elections, (2)
shows respect for the basic civil liberties and human rights of the citizens
of Cuba, (3) moves toward a market–oriented economy based on the right
to own and enjoy property, (4) makes constitutional changes to ensure the
continuation of free and fair elections and civil rights, (5) makes
demonstrable progress to establish an independent judiciary, and (6)
makes demonstrable progress in returning property nationalized in Cuba
on or after January 1, 1959.184
Helms–Burton, however, was not without its critics, the majority of
which feared the codification of the embargo would limit the foreign
policy flexibility of future presidents in dealing with Cuba.185 Similarly,
the Clinton administration was also given pause by the extraterritorial
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reach of the law. 186 Nevertheless, Clinton was determined to show
toughness on the Cuba issue. With the announcement of his support for
Helms–Burton, Clinton included additional measures that further
tightened the embargo, increased restrictions on travel to and within the
United States by Cuban officials, and suspended all chartered air travel
from the United States to Cuba.187
On March 12, 1996, President Clinton signed the Helms–Burton
Act.188 He stated that the passage of the Act should
send a powerful, unified message from the United States
to Havana, that the yearning of the Cuban people for
freedom must not be denied . . . [and the United States]
will not tolerate attacks on United States citizens and we
will stand with those both inside and outside Cuba who
are working for a peaceful transition to freedom and
democracy.189
Additionally, the co–sponsor of the bill, Dan Burton, emphatically stated
that the agreement “makes clear that Fidel Castro and his blood–soaked,
dictatorial, corrupt tyranny is about to end.”190

L. The Obama Normalization and Beyond
As history tends to demonstrate, progress comes in spurts. While
President Clinton’s successor, George W. Bush, chose not to make Cuba
a meaningful priority, the same could not be said for President Barack
Obama. Initial progress, however, was slow, and it was not until December
of 2014 that President Barack Obama directed the United States
Government to take the first steps toward the normalization of relations
between the United States and Cuba.191 The announcement was the
culmination of 18 months of secret negotiations between the U.S. and
Cuba with the help of Pope Francis.192 President Obama, in a nationally
186
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televised statement, stated that the United States “ . . . [would] end an
outdated approach that for decades has failed to advance our interests, and
instead [would] begin to normalize relations between our two
countries.”193 This agreement, President Obama stated, was calculated to
“begin a new chapter among the nations of the Americas and move beyond
a rigid policy that [was] rooted in events that took place before most of us
were born.”194
The agreement to normalize relations involved the exchange of
prisoners held in the United States and in Cuba, including Cuba’s release
of U.S. citizen Alan P. Gross and non–American, Cuban–native U.S.
intelligence “asset” Rolando Sarraff Truijllo in exchange for three Cuban
spies who were captured in 1998 and held by the United States.195 On
January 16, 2015, President Obama issued regulations that amended the
CACR and the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) and liberalized
transactions with Cuba.196 These regulations were amended various times
in the months that followed, and on July, 20 2015, the Cuban Embassy
opened in Washington D.C. for the first time since 1961.197
On the whole, the amendments eased travel restrictions for family
visits, public performances, and professional, educational, and religious
activities.198 Moreover, financial transactions on the island were affected.
While most transactions between the U.S. and Cuba were still prohibited
and OFAC continued to enforce the prohibitions of the CACR, the new
regulations permitted credit and debit card usage in Cuba and allowed
travelers to import up to $400 worth of goods from Cuba, including up to
$100 in tobacco and alcohol products.199
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For their part, Cuban officials had said that they would find it difficult
to move forward with diplomatic relations with the United States while
they were still listed as a state sponsor of terror by the United States.200 In
an act of good faith, President Obama in December 2014 instructed the
Secretary of State, John Kerry, to take steps toward reviewing Cuba’s
status as a state sponsor of terrorism.201Thereafter, the United States
department of state conducted a “rigorous” review of Cuba’s record,
wherein they found that Cuba had not engaged in recent terrorist activity
and received assurances from the Cuban government that it would not
support terrorism in the future. 202 As a result, on April 14, 2015, the White
House announced that President Obama intended to remove Cuba form
the American government’s list of nations that sponsor terrorism.203
Continuing this trend, in March of 2016, President Obama made
history as the first sitting American President to conduct a state visit to
Havana in a generation.204 Speaking in the Gran Teatro de la Habana,
President Obama stated that he had “come . . . to bury the last remnant of
the Cold War in the Americas [and to] extend a hand of friendship to the
Cuban People.”205 While President Obama went to Havana to extend an
olive branch, he took great care to emphasize the United States ‘stance on
Human Rights stating that
every person should be equal under the law. Every child
deserves the dignity that comes with education, and
healthcare, and food on the table and a roof over the
heads . . . citizens should be free to speak their minds
without fear to organize, and to criticize their government,
and to protest peacefully, and that the rule of law should
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not include arbitrary detentions of people who exercise
those rights.206
Recently, however, the viability of the current trend toward
normalization of relations has been called into question by the election of
Donald Trump as President of the United States. Prior to his election, and
in his capacity as a businessman, Trump favored economic ties with Cuba,
even going so far as to send teams to Havana to explore the possibilities
of investment in a hotel and casino.207 His political record is somewhat
more complicated as he has openly advocated for the complete
continuation of the Cuban embargo and a prohibition on business with the
Castro regime.208
During a speech on June 16, 2017 in Miami, Florida, President Trump
announced that his administration would reverse the Obama
normalization, which he called “terrible and misguided.”209 In a
Presidential Memorandum also signed on that date in Miami, President
Trump stated that his administration would prohibit economic practices
that would “disproportionately benefit the Cuban government, or its
military, intelligence, or security agencies or personnel at the expense of
the Cuban people” and that the United States would ensure adherence to
the statutory ban on tourism in Cuba.210
While regulations amending the CACR and the Export Administration
Regulations (EAR) are still forthcoming, it appears that, rhetoric aside, the
Trump administration does not intend to completely abandon the
normalization efforts of the prior administration. Importantly, guidance
from the Trump administration has allowed for a number of business
endeavors to remain.
First, commercial relationships between American enterprises and
prohibited Cuban entities that were forged prior to the announcement of
the regulations will not be affected by any new prohibitions.211 Second,
206
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President Trump’s memorandum carves out exceptions for transactions
that concern American governmental operations in Cuba, that support
programs to build democracy in Cuba, that concern air and sea operations
supporting permissible travel, cargo, or trade, that support the acquisition
of visas for permissible travel, that support the expansion of
telecommunications and internet access for the Cuban people, that support
the sale of agricultural commodities and medicines, that relate to
remittances, or that otherwise further the national security or foreign
policy interests of the United States.212 Finally, and crucially, the Trump
policy statements will not prohibit transactions with private Cuban
businesses, commonly known as cuentropropistas, which have thrived
under the recent thawing of relations with the United States.213
The fact that the policies do not amount to a complete halt in relations
may be attributable to something bigger than an internal policy choice.
Indeed, polling in 2016 found that as much as 75 percent of the American
population supports the re–establishment of relations with Cuba.214 Thus,
despite a setback, it seems that the normalization of relations will continue.
The prospects of continued engagement seem to also be increased by
Fidel Castro’s death on November 26, 2016.215 While his brother Raùl had
assumed the Cuban Presidency in 2008,216 he has stated publicly that he
plans to step down from his post as Cuba’s acting President in 2018.217
Although the younger Castro brother stated in December 2016 that Cuba
was “not going, and will not go, toward capitalism,” he stressed the
importance of foreign investments in the development of the country.218 If
he does step down in 2018, it is widely believed that his successor will be
current Vice–President Miguel Díaz–Canal, who some speculate could
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212
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possibly move Cuba toward a market economy, and whom others would
view as a mere figurehead for the Cuban military.219 Parsing the tea leaves,
President Trump may have an opportunity to make a significant impact on
bilateral relations in the coming years.

II. CURRENT ROLE AND SCOPE OF TRADING REGULATION
A. Cuban Trading Restrictions
Originally closed off to the world of trading possibilities, the Cuban
government recently announced its intentions to make strides toward
opening itself to the global economy in the near future with the
implementation of Law No. 118, which is otherwise known as Cuba’s
“Foreign Investment Act.”220 This law presents non–Cuban entities
looking to do business on the island with three options: 1) entering into a
joint venture with the Cuban government; 2) entering into an International
Economic Association agreement;221 or 3) operating as an entirely foreign
capital based corporation.222 Under the act, all foreign investments must
be approved by the Cuban Council of Ministers.223 Each of these entities,
after approval from said authorities and registration,224 are granted access
to the Cuban National Banking System, along with other privileges,
including the right to trade in residential and commercial real estate. While
the Cuban government has expressed specific preference that necessary
goods be acquired and used in Cuba, such entities are granted the ability
to import and export goods as necessary.225
The first avenue for foreign investment in Cuba is the joint venture,
which consists of at least one Cuban entity and one foreign entity, and it
requires the establishment of a separate juridical entity separate and apart
from any of the parties to the investment.226 In so doing, the parties must
219
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incorporate by creating and filing a public deed, an Articles of
Incorporation, and an association agreement.227 Generally, in these
ventures, the share capital contributions must be agreed upon by the
partners, but once the business is established, shareholders may be
changed by their own consent if there is prior approval by the authority
which granted the authorization.228
Cuba also allows investors or companies seeking to do business on the
island to enter into International Economic Association Agreements.
These agreements, are similar to a joint venture in that they involve
agreements between Cuban entities and international businesses; however,
this classification does not require the creation of a separate Cuban
juridical person, and thus, does not require incorporation.229 Even so, these
arrangements must be registered with the Cuban government by
submitting a public deed.230 Notably, parties pursuing this option must
negotiate every aspect of their agreement with the Cuban party it is
partnering with, including the agreement’s economic feasibility, the form
of management, and the legal documents needed for its formalization.231
Finally, and perhaps most enticing to international investors in Cuba,
is the option for international businesses to act as totally foreign capital
companies.232 Pursuant to this option, foreign investors retain a business
that exists wholly apart from the Cuban government. To avail themselves
of this opportunity, the foreign investors are forced to register the business
with the Cuban authorities and conduct the business within Cuba by either:
1) acting as natural persons; 2) setting up a Cuban subsidiary office as a
juridical person and registering the company as a Cuban entity; or 3) acting
as juridical persons by establishing the business as a branch of a foreign
entity.233 These companies can set up offices, branches and subsidiaries in
Cuba.234 However, this form of commerce is not undertaken in the sole
discretion of the actor. Notably, such an endeavor must be negotiated with
the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Trade and approved in writing, which
indicates the Cuban entity responsible for providing the endeavor with the
workers necessary for activity.235
The Cuban government requires that all approved business ventures
adhere to applicable Cuban laws regarding the provision of labor, which
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
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provides a default for hiring either Cuban workers or foreign workers
residing permanently in Cuba, and who have been provided by an
employing agency proposed by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and
authorized by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security.236 If the worker
provided by the Cuban government proves to be unsatisfactory in the
business, the company can request that the employing agency replace the
individual with another. 237 However, in most circumstances, it is accepted
that the management and administrative bodies of such companies can
determine those certain top administrative positions or “posts of a
technical nature” that are capable of being filled by non–Cuban
individuals.238
While Cuban tax rates are high on an international standard, Cuba has
also created certain tax loopholes meant to stimulate investment, as foreign
investors who are partners in joint ventures and parties to International
Economic Association Agreements are exempt from paying personal
income taxes for the revenues received from the business’s dividends or
profits for a period of eight (8) years.239 After that period, such taxes are
paid by the business itself at a fifteen percent (15%) rate.240 These ventures
also receive heavy breaks by avoiding taxes on the import of equipment
and machinery during the investment process,241 paying only half of the
Cuban sales tax on wholesale goods,242 paying only half of the applicable
tax rate on services, and avoiding any and all taxes for use of the labor
force.243

B. American Trading Restrictions
On the American side, considering the regulatory reinterpretations by
the Trump administration, there are a limited number of accepted trading
options between the United States and Cuba that are unlikely to be
affected. These avenues include: (1) medicines and medical devices;244 (2)
items necessary for the environmental protection of the American and
international air quality, waters and coastlines, including items related to
renewable energy or energy efficiency;245 (3) items meant to support the
Cuban people, including items that are intended to improve the living
236
237
238
239
240
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conditions of the Cuban people, support independent economic activity,
and strengthen civil society in Cuba, and improve the free flow of
information to, from, and among the Cuban people;246 (4) agricultural
commodities, including food, feed, fish, shellfish, beer, wine and spirits,
livestock, fiber including cotton, wool and other fibers, tobacco and
tobacco products, wood, seeds, and limited types of fertilizers;247 (5)
consumer communications devices, so long as no such products are
shipped to communist party organizations or officials;248 and (6)
telecommunications infrastructure, transactions related to the
establishment of facilities to provide telecommunications services linking
the United States and Cuba, and specifically including fiber–optic cable
placement and satellite facilities.249
Moreover, among some of these limited exceptions, domestic
American businesses must clear a number of administrative hurdles before
engaging in trade with Cuba. Specifically, exports to Cuba first require a
license from the Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”), which is a
sub agency of the US Department of the Treasury that “administers and
enforces trade sanctions based on US foreign policy and national security
goals against targeted foreign countries and regimes . . . .”250 OFAC acts
under the national emergency powers held by the executive, as well as
authority granted by case–specific legislation.251 Using this authority,
OFAC grants licenses to export products to countries that the United States
has imposed trade sanctions against.
OFAC’s licenses operate as an authorization to engage in an activity
that would otherwise be prohibited.252 OFAC grants two different types of
licenses: general and specific. A general license authorizes the holder to
undertake a certain transaction or activity amongst a class of persons
without the need to apply for a license.253 Conversely, “[a] specific license
is a written document issued by OFAC to a particular person or entity,
authorizing a particular transaction in response to a written license

246
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application.”254 Both travel and the export of some products to Cuba,
including agricultural and food products, require only a general license.
Nevertheless, OFAC may evaluate trade proposals that do not fall within
the penumbra of the specified exceptions on a case–by–case basis, and in
a number of limited situations, OFAC can issue specific licenses
authorizing trade.255
Once a general or specific license is issued by OFAC, an entity must
then also gain approval from the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”),
which is a sub agency of the Department of Commerce. The BIS
“[a]dvance[s] U.S. national security, foreign policy and economic
objectives by ensuring an effective export control and treaty compliance
system . . . .”256 To gain a license from the BIS, one must submit an online
application through its Simplified Network Application Process–Redesign
(“SNAP–R”) system, which requires the exporting party to supply BIS
with all the intimate details of the export, including but not limited to the
nature of the product(s) being exported, how many there are, who is
buying them and how and when shipments will take place.257
Once this information is submitted, it is then compiled and reviewed
on a case by case basis by the BIS, the Department of Defense, and other
government agencies who then choose either to accept the application or
to deny it.258 If BIS intends to deny the license application, it will notify
the applicant of the decisions inherent in such denial, and it will give the
applicant twenty (20) days to respond. If the applicant choses to respond
to such a denial but fails to persuade the BIS to change its minds, the
applicant has a right to appeal the decision within forty–five (45) days of
the date of final denial.259
Once approval has been secured from both OFAC and the BIS, the
practical concern of the physical exportation of the goods must be
entertained. Given the geographic proximity to the international trading
hubs located in the southeast United States such as New Orleans, Tampa
and Miami, and the range of seaports in Cuba, oceanic freight seems to be
the most sensible option to import goods. This too requires a license and
blessing from the United States government. To ship goods from the
United States to Cuba an exporter must have a written permit to leave
254
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American waters and enter Cuban territorial seas that is issued upon
request by the Commander of the Seventh Coast Guard District, located in
Miami, Florida.260 Once that written permit is garnered, it must be kept
onboard the vessel as it travels to and from Cuba.261.
Prior to the recent regulatory reinterpretation, all seafaring vessels that
entered Cuban ports to engage in the trade of goods or the purchase or
provision of services had to wait 180 days to reenter a US port for the
purpose of loading or unloading freight.262 However, this rule was softened
by OFAC regulations promulgated in the wake of President Obama’s
December 2014 announcement regarding the interpretation of specific
trade sanctions. These newer interpretations provide exceptions for the
aforementioned vessel ban for the shipment of cargo exported under
authorization from the Commerce Department and for vessels engaged in
the exportation or re–exportation to Cuba from a third country of
agricultural commodities, medicine or medical devices.263
The United States has also significantly changed its rules regarding
payments before exports to Cuba can take place. Before 2015, OFAC
required a cash payment for all goods exported before the actual physical
shipment of such goods could take place.264 However, now cash payments
for the exported goods are only required before the transfer of title and
control of the goods passes from an American entity to a Cuban entity.265
This change was put into place to expand financing options for exports to
Cuba and broaden the potential transaction base both now and in the
future.266

III. FUTURE SCOPE OF AMERICAN TRADE WITH CUBA
While options are currently limited, in 2014 alone trade between the
United States and Cuba accounted for 299.1 million dollars.267 Because
this number represents exports that were arranged and accounted for prior
to the 2015 regulatory re–interpretation, it stands to reason that these trade
260
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figures have the potential to improve dramatically in the long run.
However, at least initially, the overall upside of engaging in business in
the Cuban market will be limited by three practical considerations: 1) the
ability of the average Cuban citizen to purchase discretionary imported
products; 2) the established manner of doing business and 3) the ability of
a foreign business entity to reach the Cuban market.
The first major limitations to rapid economic expansion is the limited
income and wealth of the Cuban populace. In 2012, the average monthly
salary of a Cuban citizen was only 466 Cuban Pesos, or roughly 22
dollars.268 Taken in an annual calculation, this leaves the average Cuban
citizen with only 5,592 Cuban Pesos, or approximately $211 a year!269
Thus, it’s difficult to imagine how, if say, a fast food chain that desired to
operate in Cuba would be able to generate a viable customer base in the
short term. This is not to say such a strategy would not be viable in the
long term. Rather, it is simply an observation that this low–income base
will require time for the economic effects of international investment to
penetrate the market, and thereby expand. This is especially affected by
the fact that the harsh regulations imposed by the Cuban government has
resulted in a secondary market where Cubans commonly avoid buying
from established businesses and opt instead to exchange goods under the
table.270 As a result, time is also needed for the population to re–align their
buying habits.
Second, the average member of the Cuban population has limited
information access, as unrestricted home internet usage is illegal, public
internet usage is limited, and only a handful of state–run media sources
exist. 271 As a result, Cubans have become accustomed to a word–of–
mouth process to find necessary goods and services instead of traditional
American avenues of marketing.272 Thus, for corporations wishing to
compete, they face two major battles: 1) making the public aware of their
product; and 2) convincing the Cuban public to buy it.
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There are indications of hope on the horizon of information access, as
American internet giant Google recently announced a deal to house servers
in Cuba, which will facilitate faster internet access in places where usage
is permitted.273 On second thought, any incursion into the Cuban market
by brands that are not already well–known will be an uphill battle against
both state–backed products and international brand names. However,
those companies willing to pursue such a long–term battle plan have a
favorable chance to avail themselves of first mover advantages that are
inherent when a frontier market opens, providing them with the
potentiality of an extremely favorable business forecast.
Third, an American exporter would need to find a viable way to get
those goods to market. Because of the strictures of both Cuban and
American laws, achieving success on this front is not an easy task. That
being said, American–Cuban trade has been made exponentially easier by
the recent rollbacks in the American regulatory structure allowing
American entities to receive cash before the transfer of title of the products
to or from Cuba is complete.274 This is an immense development because
the prior requirement of cash before shipment was intended to be a
practical roadblock that prevented many otherwise–viable trade
opportunities in Cuba. This re–interpretation facilitates greater trade
potential because it gives exporters greater opportunities to find buyers for
their goods.
In 2014, Cuba acknowledged the emerging potential of trade
opportunities in the near future when it issued the 168–page Portfolio of
Opportunities for Foreign Investment.275 While such a document is hardly
the first manifestation of the needs of the Cuban economy, it offers a
remarkably lucid glimpse into the Cuba’s developmental visions. While
Cuba is a centrally planned economy, the document indicates that there is
room for private investors to make an impact on the Island. In 2014, Cuba
imported 9.3 billion dollars of goods,276 approximately $299,100,000.00
of which, came from the United States, making America one of Cuba’s
most prevalent trading partners.277 These figures represent a downward
trend in the current import market, as in 2012, Cuba imported
approximately $464,500,000.00 worth of TSRA–authorized American
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goods—a number that itself is only roughly half of the 2008 figure of
approximately $711,500,00.00.278 While this decline is hardly reassuring
for investors, it is a reflection of global factors including reliance on
Venezuela’s faltering economy, Cuban–imposed austerity measures, and
better financial terms being offered by other, competing countries.279
It follows that with the new regulatory reinterpretations, potential
trade with American entities will rebound healthily, especially when
considering the elimination of the requirement that prevented vessels that
had carried exported goods to Cuba from re–entering American waters for
180 days. Moreover, when considering America’s improving domestic
economy, the geographic proximity of the two nations, and a laundry list
of investment possibilities that the Cuban government has outlined, which
itself only composes a small amount of Cuba’s investment needs and
overall potential, the future for external investment in Cuba could be very
bright indeed.

IV. CONTINUED VIABILITY OF THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT
A. Access to Information
As business relationships are fostered and more capital is inserted into
the Cuban economy, it stands to reason that the state and status of the
Cuban citizen will improve as well, as more investments and imports will
translate into more jobs and opportunities. This “economic invasion”
constitutes a foundational American policy objective, which is based on
the belief that such an injection of capital will serve the interests of
democracy by also fostering access to information.280 In short, the United
States is betting that a more affluent and informed populace will be more
capable to control its own destiny.
It stands to reason that if the economic realities of the Cuban people
expand, the Cuban government will experience difficulty in continuing to
control the information accessed by the population. As Cuba attempts to
hang on to power, there can be no doubt that it will look to China as an
example of a central government that has found ways to control and
counter the political impact of internet use through filtering content,
monitoring online behavior or manufacturing its own content.
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Nonetheless, for every measure taken to deprive access to information, the
current state of global technology will likely ensure the proliferation of
information whether the Cuban government assents to it or not.281

B. Cuban Governmental Reforms
As the state of the Cuban economy improves and Cuban citizens reach
toward prosperity, it seems reasonable to speculate that increased access
to capital could put pressure on the Cuban government to make meaningful
democratic and capitalistic reforms. In some ways, this movement has
already begun. In 2015, for the first time since the Cuban Revolution, local
elections were held featuring representatives that were not members of the
communist party.282 While both candidates took part in small elections,
and neither were victorious, an important precedent was forged in that for
the first time in decades questioning the direction and scope of the Cuban
government was both safe and acceptable.283
Perhaps this new direction is the result of the leadership of Raũl
Castro, who, after assuming power, has shown somewhat of a pragmatic
streak. Indeed, the prospects of a slowing economy and dire financial
circumstances have already forced the younger Castro’s hand, and a 1
billion dollar Mariel free trade zone project is one such example.284 There,
Cuba has built a deep–water port intended to facilitate increased exports
through competitive customs and tax incentives.285 In an era with less
restrictions on trade between the United States and Cuba, the Mariel Free
Trade Zone could be a major economic engine for Cuban development. In
such a scenario, capital from the project, and the private investment it
brings, could find its way into the populace, thereby creating new and
diverse product and service demands and leading Cuba to bring its trade
policy in line with the rest of the world.
These rosy economic possibilities are also supported by the tangible
characteristics of the Cuban populace, which is well–educated and healthy.
As in many underutilized economies, these individuals are a vast untapped
resource. And, at least in Cuba, the possibility of greater utilization looms
on the horizon. Consequently, there is great potential for beneficial
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external and secondary effects of increased relations between the United
States and Cuba.

V. PRELUDE OR DEJA VU
It is said sometimes that history is cyclical. From this standpoint, the
question then becomes whether these current developments are really
something new, or if they are merely a reincarnation of the American
dominance of early 1900’s Cuba. To be sure, there is a legitimate argument
in favor of the latter, based on the potential of new and exponential
investment into Cuba. But that seems unlikely.
When the United States and Cuba last shared close ties, Cuba was
emerging from hundreds of years of Spanish dominance. When American
interests spread in the wake of the Spanish–American War, the nature of
the cultural and economic influence left some to wonder whether Cuba
was sovereign in name only. However, that impact was facilitated by the
lack of definition at the time of what it meant to be distinctly and uniquely
Cuban. That is no longer the case. While the horrors of the Cuban
Revolution are well known, including the repression of the Cuban
citizenry and the artificial choking of economic growth, one thing that it
has allowed is the creation of a uniquely Cuban identity. What does this
mean? It seems likely that while foreign investment will enhance the lives
of ordinary Cubans, the idea and desire of an independent and unique
Cuban state will remain in their hearts and minds. Thus, while there may
be a future wherein Cuba has American enterprise and influence, it seems
likely that it will be in addition to, not in spite of, the existence of distinctly
Cuban business and culture.

